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[2015] PILARS CC 1 
 
Parrillo v Italy: is there life in the European Court 
of Human Rights? 
 
Jessica Giles1 
Simon Lee2 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has ruled for the first time on the question 
of whether article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights encompasses 
the right to make use of embryos obtained from in vitro fertilisation for the 
purpose of donating to scientific research. The case of Parrillo v Italy App no 
46470/11 raises questions concerning the legal status of the embryo and the 
consequences of that status including the rights, duties and responsibilities of 
those who have a genetic connection to the embryo or who have committed 
themselves to potential parenthood by undertaking a course of in vitro fertilisation 
treatment resulting in the creation of embryos. 
 
Ms Adelina Parrillo was born in 1954. In 2002 she and her partner underwent in 
vitro fertilisation treatment in Rome, Italy, from which five embryos were 
obtained. The applicant’s partner subsequently died in a bomb attack in Iraq 
before the embryos could be implanted. The applicant sought, and was refused, 
release of the cyropreserved embryos, from the Centre of reproductive medicine 
at the European hospital in Rome, in order to donate the embryos for stem cell 
research. The Centre refused on the grounds that such research was banned 
pursuant to section 13 of Law no 40 of 19 February 2004 (‘the 2004 Law’). This 
Act came into force four months after the death of the applicant’s partner. 
 
The applicant alleged to the ECtHR that the ban under section 13 of the 2004 
Law was incompatible with her right to respect for her private life pursuant to 
article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and her right to peaceful 
enjoyment of her possessions pursuant to article 1 of Protocol 1. 
 
Article 8 of the ECHR reads: 
 
‘1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life… 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
his right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in 
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Jessica Giles is a law lecturer at the Open University and an associate editor of the Oxford 
Journal of Law and Religion	  2	  Simon Lee is a Fellow of St Edmund’s College, Cambridge, Emeritus Professor of 
Jurisprudence, Queen’s University Belfast, and (from 1 December 2015) Professor of Law at the 
Open University. 
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the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.’ 
 
On 27 August 2015 in Parrillo v Italy, the Court judged the application pursuant to 
article 8 admissible and the application pursuant to article 1 of Protocol 1 
inadmissible. 
 
It was accepted by the parties that if article 8 was applicable then the 2004 Law 
did amount to an infringement of the applicant’s right to private life pursuant to 
article 8. Since the interference had occurred pursuant to the 2004 Law it was in 
accordance with the law. The issue, therefore, before the Court was whether it 
pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. 3 
 
The Italian government put forward, as their legitimate aim for interference with 
the article 8 right, the aim of protecting human dignity, which, according to Italian 
law, was accorded to the human embryo as a subject of law. 
 
The Court ruled that the ‘protection of the embryo’s potential for life’4 could be 
linked to the aim of protecting morals ‘or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others’ pursuant to article 8.2, without deciding that the term ‘others’ 
applied to embryos, that is without making a decision which would imply that 
embryos were a human life meriting protection under that section. 
 
It then went on to consider that these reasons were relevant and sufficient for the 
purposes of justifying the interference pursuant to article 8.2. This was because 
the margin of appreciation permitted to a member state was wider where there 
was no European consensus and where the case raised sensitive moral or 
ethical issues, as in the present case. Furthermore the Court ruled that this was 
not a case concerning prospective parenthood and therefore it did not concern a 
particularly important aspect of the applicant’s existence and identity thus 
enabling the Court to accord the member state a wide margin of appreciation. 
Furthermore the Court found that the choice to donate embryos was a decision of 
the applicant alone, and there was no evidence that her partner had or would 
have made the same choice. For these reasons the Court found there was no 
violation of the applicant’s article 8 right. 
 
The Court’s approach to the Convention as a ‘living instrument’ adaptable to 
changes in social attitudes has recently been denounced by Professor John 
Finnis. This is significant in the context of the debate on the United Kingdom’s 
Conservative government’s manifesto pledge to ‘scrap’ the Human Rights Act 
1998 and to introduce a ‘British Bill of Rights’. His lecture on Judicial Power in 
October 2015 was introduced and commended by the government minister now 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  merits	  of	  the	  application	  are	  considered	  by	  the	  court	  at	  paragraphs	  169-­‐198.	  4	  Parrillo	  v	  Italy,	  para	  167	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responsible for this measure, Michael Gove, the Justice Secretary and Lord 
Chancellor5.  
 
Finnis is not the first to question the approach of the European Court. In recent 
lectures, Lords Hoffmann6 and Sumption7 have been critical of the perceived 
excesses of the ‘living instrument’ approach and even a strong supporter of the 
ECHR and the Human Rights Act 1998, Baroness Hale, Deputy President of the 
UK Supreme Court, has pointed out that,  
 
‘…the image of a ‘living tree’ may be more helpful than the image of a 
‘living instrument’. A violin is an instrument, but it has no life of its own, 
only the life it is given by the violinist who plays it. A tree has a life of its 
own, but it can only grow and develop within its natural limits. It is not an 
unstoppable beanstalk grown from a magic bean.’8  
 
Finnis is scathing in his critique of the Court in Hirst v United Kingdom No 2 App 
no 74025/01 [2005] ECHR 681 on prisoners’ right to vote and of the Court’s 
decision in Hirsi Jamaa and others v Italy App no 27765/09 making it difficult to 
send migrant boats back to Libya, which he considers to be ‘an important cause 
(among complex causes) of today’s migration crisis’. He is especially sceptical of 
the Court’s approach to article 3, where he criticises its ‘creation of a huge body 
of rights of asylum law, in the context of a Convention quite certainly intended to 
contain no right to asylum’.  
 
Professor Finnis is also, however, well known for his upholding of the intrinsic 
moral worth of the human embryo and his opposition to embryo experimenting 
and indeed his opposition to in vitro fertilization. See, for example, his previously 
unpublished essay on C S Lewis and Test Tube Babies in John Finnis, Human 
Rights and the Common Good,9 especially at pp 278-281:  
 
‘The essential conditions of the IVF child’s origin … tend to assign this 
child, in its inception, the same status as other objects of acquisition. The 
technical skills and decisions of the child’s makers will have produced, 
they hope, a good product, a desirable acquisition’.  
 
Finnis proceeds to identify, ‘The great evils of destructive experimentation, 
observation, and selection’ as signs of this attitude of envisaging a child as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	   The whole event can be seen on video and a transcript of the lecture can be read at 
http://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/john-finnis-judicial-power-past-present-and-future/). 	  6	  Lord	  Hoffmann,	  The	  Universality	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  Judicial	  Studies	  Board	  Annual	  Lecture,	  19	  March	  2009:	  http://justice-­‐for-­‐families.org.uk/documents/reports/JStudiesBoardLecture0309.htm.	  	  	  7	  Lord	  Sumption,	  The	  Limits	  of	  Law,	  https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-­‐131120.pdf	  8	  http://www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/beanstalk-or-living-instrument-how-tall-can-the-
european-convention-on-human	  9	  John	  Finnis	  Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  Common	  Good:	  Collected	  Essays	  Volume	  III	  (2011)	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  Oxford	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product. He rejects this ‘radical domination’ as ‘not truly parental’. As for the 
embryo, Finnis’s view is that, 
 
‘Since the culmination of the process of fertilization, each one of us has 
maintained not only the same genetic code or, more precisely, genetic 
constitution (practically unique to himself or herself) but also an organic 
integration which will remain until death. So it is not only the identity and 
singularity of genetic constitution of each stage (and indeed in each cell) 
which justifies this fundamental proposition: the human person’s bodily life 
begins at conception and lasts until the death of that individual.’ 
 
According to Finnis, it follows that, 
 
‘Certain aspects of much current IVF practice are, therefore, 
fundamentally unacceptable and ought to be prohibited by any civilized 
community.’ 
 
It is therefore intriguing that his lecture on Judicial Power did not address the 
recent decision of the European Court in August 2015, in Parrillo v Italy, to 
prevent a woman from donating embryos to research. His bête-noire, the 
European Court of Human Rights, is in the particular context of this Italian law 
following something close to his defence of the human embryo in a case of 
fundamental significance for humanity at its most vulnerable.  
 
This case also contains, one might say in embryonic form, some sense that there 
is life in the European Court of Human Rights that does not amount to a ‘living 
tree’ or ‘living instrument’ or ‘instrumentalist’ approach but which is potentially 
compatible with Professor Finnis’s strictures. The way forward, we suggest, is to 
engage with the arguments proposed by the judges and to call for ambiguities to 
be addressed in subsequent cases. Finnis is rightly sceptical of the way the 
Court uses ‘blanket ban’ as a catch-all phrase. But it would be a mistake to have 
a blanket condemnation of the Court without paying heed to the arguments 
between the judges in Parrillo. A full analysis, let alone our own views, must 
await a later article. In this comment, however, we draw attention to some of the 
questioning and question-begging elements in the opinions.    
 
The concurring opinion of Judge Pinto De Albuquerque argues robustly that, ‘The 
majority’s reasoning is both contradictory in terms of logic and scientifically 
inadmissible.’ The judge insists on addressing the status of the human embryo 
because, ‘Otherwise the Court would be giving up the most basic of its tasks, 
namely, protecting human beings from any form of instrumentalisation.’ 
 
This opinion is full of insights which could have been drafted by Finnis. Even a 
footnote (number 32) points out that,  
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‘The applicant’s position is in fact contradictory because she also claims 
that she has a property right over her embryos. It is unacceptable to 
invoke at the same time a right to property and a right to privacy with 
regard to the human embryos ‘owned’. Unless the implication were that 
using and disposing of human beings – in the instant case human 
embryos – would be a form of maintaining a relationship with them.’10  
 
The judge’s main reason for objecting to the majority’s approach is this: 
 
‘31. The majority’s reasoning is both contradictory in terms of logic and 
scientifically inadmissible. It is contradictory in terms of logic because they 
admit, on the one hand, that the embryo is an “other” for the purposes of 
Article 8 § 2 of the Convention, since the protection of the embryo’s 
potential for life may be linked to the aim of protecting the “rights and 
freedoms of others” (see paragraph 167). On the other hand, however, the 
same majority affirm that this acknowledgment does not involve any 
assessment by the Court as to whether the word “others” extends to 
human embryos. The patent logical contradiction between the two 
statements is so obvious that it is irremediable. The only possible reading 
of this contradiction is that the majority were so divided that they could not 
decide whether the statement of principle in paragraph 59 of Costa and 
Pavan should prevail over the opposite statement of principle in paragraph 
228 of A, B and C v. Ireland ([GC], no. 25579/05, ECHR 2010)…’ 
 
The judge criticises the majority for their  
 
‘rhetorical “fallacy of the undistributed middle”, according to which the 
majority assume that because they share a common property two 
separate categories are connected. In other words, in interpreting the 
Constitutional Court’s judgment of 10 June 2014 the majority assume that 
because the right to become a parent is an aspect of a person’s private 
life, as is the right to have IVF treatment, both of these rights are 
unfettered ones in so far as they are rights to “self-determination”, thus 
forgetting that the exercise of “self-determination” of the progenitors in the 
latter case may impinge upon the existence of another human life: that of 
the non-implanted embryo.’ 
  
He then goes on to criticize the majority’s reasoning that ‘the embryos contain 
the genetic material of the person in question and accordingly represent a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The next footnote warns that,  
‘Although paragraph 65 of Costa and Pavan uses the word “right”, this unfortunate 
maladresse de plume should not be taken literally, since the same judgment also refers, 
in paragraph 57, to the parents’ “desire” to have a healthy child. The circumstances of the 
Costa and Pavan case are in no way similar to the present case, and can certainly not be 
used to ground an unfettered “negative right” to decide the fate of non-implanted 
embryos.’  
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constituent part of that person’s genetic material and biological identity’11 on the 
basis that the embryo, despite genetic links, is a different biological identity from 
the person who has undergone IVF. He regards the majority reasoning as 
unacceptable in ontological and biological terms, arguing that human dignity 
makes it imperative to respect ‘the uniqueness and diversity’ of each human 
being in accordance with the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and 
Human Rights. 
 
He identifies the contradiction between paragraph 158, where the majority say 
that the embryos represent a ‘constituent part’ of the genetic material of the 
applicant and of her biological identity and that in paragraph 174 where they 
conclude that the protection of a ‘constituent part’ of the applicant’s biological 
identity is not one of the core rights of article 8.  
 
His conclusion on admissibility is that since the embryo is not a thing or a 
‘possession’, it is an ‘other’ within the meaning of article 8, with whom the person 
who has undergone in vitro fertilisation has a potential parental relationship and 
that the private nature of the relationship arises in so far as the embryo has a 
unique biological identity, but shares genetic material with the progenitors. 
 
His view, consequent upon that is that unborn human life is no different in 
essence from born life and that human embryos must be treated in all 
circumstances with the respect due to human dignity. Furthermore, the beginning 
and end of human life are not questions of policy subject to the discretion of the 
member States of the Council of Europe but are subject to close scrutiny by the 
Court, since States have a narrow margin of appreciation with regard to 
fundamental issues related to the human being’s existence and identity.  
 
Ultimately, the majority manage to come to the right answer, in this judge’s 
opinion, because they conclude that the embryo is an ‘other’, rather than a thing 
or a possession.  
 
A joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Casadevall, Ziemele, Power-Forde, De 
Gaetano and Yudkivska has a similar critique of ‘the muddled reasoning of the 
majority’ which merits their use of a double exclamation mark in amazement that 
the majority are so quick to deny ‘any assessment as to whether the word 
‘others’ extends to human embryos!!’ 
 
Judge Sajo dissents from the opposite perspective on the basis that in Italy both 
abortion and research on foreign stem cell lines are permitted. He ‘cannot see 
why preponderant weight is attached to the potential for life when Italian law does 
allow the abortion of a viable foetus, and in the particular circumstances of the 
present case where, in the absence of the consent of the applicant, that potential 
cannot materialise.’  
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Parrillo	  v	  Italy,	  para	  158	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Finnis might retort that one could equally say that the logic of this is to cast doubt 
on Italian abortion law. Or one might argue that the law takes a different stance 
because law-makers think that the differences between in ventro and in vitro are 
relevant. The Italian government made the point that in the case of abortion the 
rights of the foetus had to be weighed against the rights of the mother: see para 
125. The point here being that a pregnancy inevitably puts the life of the mother 
at risk whereas the existence of an embryo outside the womb does not place any 
such risk on the mother, consequently the rationale for abortion does not apply to 
the issue of experimentation on or destruction of embryos.  
 
Parrillo sees in vitro fertisliation in a completely different light to Finnis’s critique 
and would have seen the use of the embryos for research as a positive 
contribution to the common good. She and her partner wanted a child. She did 
not share Finnis’s ethical and/or religious objections to IVF. Her partner was then 
killed. The human embryos were then not going to be given the opportunity to 
grow in a womb. Whether or not she should have foreseen that this might have 
happened, by the time she faced the issue, the best she thought she could do to 
give meaning to the creation of life in these embryonic forms was to offer them 
for medical research. When the alternative was destruction or, as the dissenting 
judge put it, ‘to languish indefinitely until such (unknown and unknowable) time 
as the embryos lost viability or could be used for a procreative purpose contrary 
to her clearly expressed wishes’, there might be considerable sympathy for 
Parrillo’s ethical dilemma. One of us has described such cases as ‘uneasy’ in the 
sense of not only being ‘hard’ but leaving many people with a sense of un-ease12, 
whatever the outcome. Finnis appears not to have such qualms.  
 
In a later article, we intend to return to these underlying ethical concerns and to 
look at the implications of this decision for cognate areas of the law. For now, 
however, we conclude this note by applauding the efforts of those judges who 
stood apart from the crowd to give us more detailed, reasoned opinions. Finnis 
concludes his lecture by quoting his friend, the retired Australian High Court 
judge, Dyson Heydon quoting Lord Bingham: ‘Judicial independence involves 
independence from one’s colleagues.’ The Parrillo case demonstrates that 
judges of the ECtHR are prepared to exercise their judicial independence in 
order to encourage future opinions to give deeper reasons for their conclusions.  
In more ways than one, therefore, Parrillo v Italy shows how there is indeed life in 
the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Simon	  Lee,	  Uneasy	  Ethics	  (2003,	  Pimlico,	  Random	  House,	  London,	  ebook	  edition,	  2011)	  
	   8	  
 
  
